Friday, January 21, 2011

Attorneys Fees and Costs in Exceptional Patent Cases

35 U.S.C. § 285 provides for attorneys fees and costs, under exceptional circumstances in a patent litigation. This section must be interpreted against the back-ground of the Supreme Court’s decision in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus-tries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). The right to bring and defend litigation implicates a party’s First Amendment rights. Therefore, allegedly frivolous conduct can only be sanctioned if a lawsuit is “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.” Id. at 60. “Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant’s subjective motivation.” Id. In determining whether a particular litigation is “exceptional” under § 285, the relevant standard is set forth in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). An award of attorneys’ fees is permissible “when there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, or like infractions.” Id. at 1381. A court must find both (1) that a litigation was objectively baseless and (2) was brought in subjective bad faith. Id.; see also Wedgetail Ltd. v. Huddleston Deluxe, Inc., 576 F.3d 1302, 1304–06 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (refusing to find patentee’s unsuccessful case exceptional under Brooks Furniture).

According to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in a recent decision in iLOR v. Google, an “…infringement action ‘does not become unreasonable in terms of [§ 285] if the infringement can reasonably be disputed,” citing Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1384. The patentee’s case must (1) have no objective foundation, and (2) the plaintiff must actually know this. And both the objective and subjective prongs of the test “must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” iLOR citing Wedgetail, 576 F.3d at 1304.

Furthermore a “presumption that the assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith” exists. See Id. citing Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1382 (citing Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The plaintiff’s state of mind is irrelevant to the objective baselessness inquiry. See Id.; Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (“[S]tate of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to [the] objective inquiry.”). “Only after this objective baselessness is established by clear and convincing evidence is the subjective bad faith of the plaintiff at issue.” Id. See Id., stating “…we conclude that a finding of objective baselessness has not been met here, and we need not consider the issue of subjective bad faith.” According to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the “question is whether iLOR’s broader claim construction was so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed”); citing Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under this standard, the defendant’s bears a heavy burden to show that a claim construction is so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe that plaintiff would succeed. Where as in iLOR, the claim construction issues are complex and no summary judgment of noninfringement is granted, it is very difficult to meet the movants heavy burden to show objective baselessness by clear and convincing evidence.

Uniloc Overrules the 25% Rule

A decision in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation overruled any use of the 25% rule as a legitimate rule of thumb in determining a reasonable royalty. Instead, damages experts are left with the Georgia-Pacific factors. In particular, looking at royalties paid or received in licenses for the patent in suite or in comparable licenses and looking at the portion of profit that may be customarily allowed in the particular business for the use of the invention or similar inventions may be the sole legitimate basis for commencing a determination of a reasonable royalty in hypothetical negotiations. It is not clear that this evidentiary ruling will reign in excessive damages based on flawed calculations of unrealistic royalty calculations, but the decision in Uniloc should make it more difficult for experts to hand wave and rule of thumb their way to a reasonable royalty.